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This paper looks at the TTIP from a trade policy perspective. It argues that while TTIP is an 
unprecedented bilateral agreement, it does not constitute a Polanyian moment. TTIP is 
unprecedented in both EU and international trade policy terms because it offers an alternative 
to WTO multilateralism. Never before has bilateralism offered such a ‘best alternative to no 
agreement’ (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating 
arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, 
however, has not been driven either by geopolitical or trade liberalization concerns but by 
fears about EU bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public 
policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents to TTIP reflect 
concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the same. 
The US is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able 
to impose its preferences which are considered too neo-liberal.  
 
1. Introduction 
When TTIP negotiations commenced in 2013 proponents’ main arguments centered on the 
agreement’s potential economic benefits. Removing most or all tariffs and (up to) half of non-
tariff barriers would increase trade and investments, spur growth, and create jobs 
(Felbermayr, 2013; François, 2013). The economic benefits of a TTIP for both Europe and the 
US far exceed those resulting from a potential completion of the Doha Round, and are worth 
five times the EU-South Korean deal (cf.eg. Erixon and Bauer 2010). Economic gains 
notwithstanding, the debate has come to focus predominantly on standards and geopolitical 
gains, with advocates arguing that TTIP would go further than any previous agreement; setting 
high global standards in most sectors, while solidifying the rules-based international system 
erected primarily by the transatlantic partners after WWII. Opponents tend to disagree, 
arguing TTIP may threaten public health, safety, and services.  
 
This paper first looks at how TTIP’s (potential) geopolitical impact makes it unique in 
international and EU trade policy. We examine how TTIP is unprecedented because it implies 
creating an alternative to multilateralism through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
that in turn reflects a shift in EU trade policy bilateral approach. In fact, never before has 
bilateralism offered such an appealing ‘best alternative to no agreement’ (BATNA) in the WTO. 
By so doing, we complement De Bièvre & Poletti’s public goods approach (this debate-section) 
on the international implications of TTIP, while challenging their conclusion that this 




In the second half of the paper we turn to opponents’ arguments. Opponents have 
continuously asserted that TTIP threaten Europeans’ health and safety. Premised on the 
assumption that American standards are lower and that an agreement including mutual 
recognition or convergence of regulations will allow American products with lower standards 
into the EU, they foresee a ‘race to the bottom’ on standards (cf. e.g. De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 
2016). They also claim that business will gain the upper hand in public policy through the 
inclusion of a corporate-biased investment arbitration system (BEUC, 2014; Friends of the 
Earth, 2016). These arguments have provoked unprecedented and vocal public opposition, and 
De Ville & Siles-Brügge (this debate-section) argue that TTIP may well represent in Polanyian 
terms a societal move against market “disembedding” (what we refer to from now on as a 
Polanyian moment). By looking at the underlying assumptions of these claims, we instead 
argue that TTIP concerns are driven by fears about the EU’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the US. 
 
2. Why TTIP is an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer  
The US and its European allies erected and then controlled the governance of the international 
trade system for several decades after WWII. Despite concessions to developing countries, 
consensus building in both the GATT and the WTO up until 2003 depended on agreement in 
the so-called Quad (the US, the EC/EU, Japan and Canada). After the WTO ministerial meeting 
in Cancún in 2003, two emerging markets (India and Brazil) replaced two developed countries 
(Japan and Canada) in the Quad, with three other members occasionally joining to form groups 
like the G5 (with Australia), G6 (which adds Japan) or G7 (which adds China). Thus, while the 
transatlantic partners remain the key players in the new nucleus of power in the multilateral 
trade system, they now have to address concerns from countries opposed to the dominance of 





As this power realignment within the WTO failed to enable a completion of the Doha Round in 
2008, leading to stalemate in multilateral negotiations and raising doubts whether the WTO 
could serve its core mission of trade liberalization, TTIP could be what Steinberg (2002:349) 
calls an ‘exit tactic’. In short, the potential for Old Quad partners establishing a preferential 
market through bilateral agreements (i.e., threating isolation) would lead the new de facto 
trade veto players in the WTO to lower their expectations and facilitate a WTO multilateral (or 
at least plurilateral) compromise. There is some tentative evidence to this effect. Since the 
TTIP negotiations were launched, some mini-package agreements have been possible in the 
WTO Ministerial Meetings both of December 2013 in Bali and December 2015 in Nairobi, 
arguably to prevent the WTO negotiating arm from becoming irrelevant (Falconer, 2015; 




However, serving as a response to problems with multilateral negotiations, this time the Doha 
Round, would not make TTIP an unprecedented bilateral agreement. The existence of a nexus 
between the multilateral context and other bilateral agreements has been underlined by 
several authors. Bergsten and Schott (1997: 3), in their preliminary evaluation of NAFTA, argue 
that ‘The startup of NAFTA negotiations in 1991 gave renewed impetus to the Uruguay Round 
in the GATT, which had stalled in 1990 because of US-Europe differences over agriculture, by 
reminding the Europeans that the United States could pursue alternative trade strategies.’ 
Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003: 829) find that ‘developments at the heart of GATT/WTO 
encourage its members to form PTAs [preferential trade agreements] as devices to obtain 
bargaining leverage within the multilateral regime’. Their conclusion has been vindicated in a 
more recent quantitative analysis where Baccini and Dür (2012) find that ‘countries are more 
likely to sign an agreement in tandem with negotiations at the WTO level’ (p 75).  
 
What makes TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer is that even if it fails to foster 
an agreement at the multilateral level (‘exit tactic’ fails), TTIP still offers the EU and the US the 
possibility of establishing global rules. The size of the transatlantic market (50% of global FDI 
and 40% of global trade, and the EU remains the US’ largest market even after the UK leaves), 
the scope of TTIP (especially regulatory cooperation and convergence, investment rules, and 
standard setting across several other sectors, including autos; see De Ville & Siles-Brügge, this 
debate section), and the development of trade through supply-chains give the EU-US tandem 
an unprecedented capacity for regulatory export. Never before had bilateralism offered such 




The benefits of rules convergence and regulatory equivalence are pronounced in helping 
companies better integrate in the supply-chain trade. Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) 
show that international supply chains are both global and regional in nature, structured 
around three regional supply networks or factories (Factory Asia, Factory Europe and Factory 
North-America), where the US, Germany, Japan, and China dominate supply-chain trade 
globally. In such a context, an agreement between two of the regions (factories) – i.e., the 
exclusion of at least an important part of one if taking account of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement between Japan and the EU – may 
consolidate vital global value chains and therefore affect the regulatory strategies of 
companies in both signature states and third countries, while an agreement on either technical 
standards or rules (investment, public procurement, competition policy, environment or labor) 
also spurs third country exporters’ adaptation to the integrated zone (here TTIP). In a context 
of supply-chains emerging countries’ exporters (read especially China) will have to comply with 
standards to access the transatlantic market place; additionally, TTIP member firms exporting 
parts and components to emerging markets constitute a second level of external pressure on 




De Bièvre & Poletti (this debate-section) explain how and why third countries are expected to 
react by adaptation rather than confrontation to TTIP standards and rules. Our main interest 
here is to underline that the potential to establish global standards and rules (even if their 
spread will not be uniform across space and time) makes TTIP a case of what Morse and 
Keohane (2014) call ‘contested multilateralism’ (or ‘counter-multilateralism’)
4
. More 
specifically, TTIP takes the form of ‘competitive regime creation’(Ibid), where two powerful 
actors, the US and the EU, challenge the institutional (WTO) status quo, dissatisfied with its 
progress by creating a new institution. Hence, the objective is not to substitute multilateralism 
with bilateralism but rather to create an alternative to established multilateralism. It is the first 
time that the WTO faces such a challenge. 
 
The fact that TTIP represents a challenge to the established international trade regime (WTO) 
also makes it an unprecedented agreement from an EU trade policy perspective. At first sight, 
TTIP does not look unique. As other bilateral agreements the EU is negotiating with developed 
countries, it evidences the two successive changes EU’s trade policy bilateral approach has 
undergone in the 21
st
 century: a shift towards commercial aims and a shift towards 
safeguarding EU position in the international trade order. Regarding the first, in 2006 the 
Commission officially abandoned its self-imposed moratorium (since 1999) on new preferential 
trade agreements. While political and security interests were traditionally pursued through 
bilateral and/or regional agreements, the bilateral approach would now also serve economic 
interests, initially focusing on major emerging economies. As the European Commission put it 
in Global Europe (2006:10-11),’FTAs are by no means new for Europe. …But while our current 
bilateral agreements support our neighbourhood and development objectives well, our main 
trade interests, including in Asia, are less well served. …economic factors must play a primary 
role in the choice of future FTAs’. The second shift was captured in Commission’s 2010 
communiqué (Trade, Growth and World Affairs) and reinforced in the EU’s new (2015a) trade 
policy strategy, Trade for All. Both documents advocate focusing on bilateral agreements with 
non-European developed countries, that is, with the members of the old trade ‘club’ that had 
controlled the governance of the trade multilateral system up until Cancún (see Keohane and 
Nye, 2001 on the post-WWII ‘club model’).
 
On the other hand, however, TTIP is different from 
the other bilateral agreements the EU is negotiating with developed countries because it is the 
only one to offer a BATNA vis-à-vis a multilateral agreement. 
 
To sum up, what makes the TTIP an unprecedented bilateral agreement both in international 
and EU trade policy terms is its capacity to substitute for WTO standards and rules setting arm. 
TTIP offers its partners (EU-US) the possibility to continue setting global standards without the 
need to reach agreement with other key trade players at the WTO.  That capacity however 
relies on the partners being able to reach an ambitious agreement on non-tariffs issues, which 
in turn implies a sharing of sovereignty that, as we argue in the next section, is being 





3. Why TTIP does not constitute a Polanyian moment  
Its many benefits notwithstanding, TTIP negotiations have faced unprecedented and 
increasingly vocal public opposition, generated by European civil society groups (CSO). De Ville 
& Siles-Brügge (in this section) argue that TTIP is a Polanyian-moment because the debate 
centers on a trade-off between EU values and trade liberalization. Here we challenge their 
conclusion. Rather than apprehension towards trade liberalization TTIP opposition is driven by 
concerns with the EU’s bargaining power and fears that the US will impose its neo-liberal 
market-oriented model. If the EU was perceived as stronger than the US, TTIP would not be 
contested (or at least to a much lesser extent).  
 
Our argument is based on both empirics and a counterfactual. As to the first, Eurobarometer 
surveys show EU wide support for TTIP shrunk from 59 % to 52% between April 2014 and 
November 2015, but German support plummeted, from 55% to 17% by April 2016; another 
trade-dependent member, Austria exhibited a similar decline. Yet there is no correlation 
between opinions on trade in general across the EU (which remains stable at 65-88%) and 
views on TTIP.
5
 Furthermore, while a plurality of Germans admit not knowing enough about 
TTIP to form an opinion (meaning they can be swayed), Germans strongly support free trade 
and never previously expressed fears that an agreement would impose a partner’s standards, 
yet that is exactly what those opposing TTIP fear (Bertelsmann, 2016; Emnid, 2015; Pew, 
2014). 
 
As to the counterfactual: if TTIP was a Polanyian moment, we would expect a ‘new threshold 
had been crossed in the balance between “market” and “authority”, with governments 
assuming much more direct responsibility for domestic social security and economic stability’ 
(Ruggie,1982: 388). In other words, it would imply a shift from less government involvement to 
more direct control over market forces. Yet, upon inspection one finds that opponents are not 
demanding increased ‘authority’ over the ‘market’ in their main issues of contention: the 
investment arbitration system and EU standards. On the first, opponents are instead afraid of 
governments losing ‘authority’ to the ‘market’. On the second, the problem is not the balance 
between ‘authority’ and the ‘market’ but the balance between ‘authorities’. 
 
If opponents would have wanted increased ’authority’ over the ’market’ on investors rights, 
they should welcome reforms which curtail corporate access to legal redress vis-à-vis 
governments, like those proposed by the European Commission. EU Member States are 
signatories to over 1,400 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs, of which 200 are intra EU, cf. 
European Commission, 2015b), containing vaguely worded language on when and how a 
foreign investor may sue the state for violating the terms of its investment agreement, a 
general system called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). In September 2015, in 
response to public outcry, the Commission presented a highly reformed, narrowly defined, and 
 
 
precedent setting arbitration system (now called Investment Court System) for inclusion in 
TTIP (a modified version was adopted in CETA).  
 
While some would advocate further changes, there is consensus that the proposed reforms 
include an increase of ‘authority’ over the process: explicit public policy safeguards, narrow 
definition of terminology, allowance for external submissions, transparency in filings, 
prohibition on dual track pursuits, empowerment of arbitrators to dismiss unwarranted cases, 
bans on tobacco company claims, and ‘loser pays legal expenses’ provisions (Commission, 
2015c). Most opponents, however, remain unconvinced, persisting in their argument that any 
investment arbitration system inclusion in TTIP would lead to ‘regulatory chill’ (where 
governments lose ‘authority’ to the ‘market’, e.g. Friends of the Earth, 2016). When asked 
specifically why the status quo would be preferable to reforms the responses from a leading 
EU-wide CSO and a labor union organization were, respectively, ‘the other agreements were 
not our focus, not our priority…[now] our strategy is to stop ISDS in TTIP and CETA first, then 
go after the BITs over time’, and tellingly, ‘we have no strategy, we don’t know’.
6
 The 
underlying problem therefore does not seem to be the arbitration system per se but rather the 
partner.   
 
Another arrow pointing in this direction is the timing of the protests. If opponents were solely 
worried about the investment arbitration system’s inadequacies, they would have already 
protested against pre-existing BITs. Objections arising after 55 years of practice and with ISDS 
included in other recent agreements, point to the real problem being the US; a point dismissed 
in public but acknowledged in private by two of the largest pan-European organizations.
7
 De 
Ville & Siles-Brügge (in this section) reference a CSO report that TTIP would be more difficult to 
terminate than existing bilateral BITs, partly because more investment is affected. Yet if the 
principle objection is to the unfair nature of the arbitration system even a single treaty with 
ISDS should be objectionable, and there were no protests or public mobilization prior to TTIP’s 
launch. 
 
Further convoluting opponents’ argument is the acknowledgment by groups such as BEUC that 
European firms need investment protection in certain countries with politicized and corrupt 
courts (read China, Brazil, and India). However, not only would this entail a politicization of 
when and where ISDS is appropriate (imagine attempting agreement on what constitutes ‘a 
mature and independent legal system’), not all European and American courts are paragons of 
legal virtue. The US State Department’s 2015 Investment Climate Statements reveal concerns 
about investor protection in Romania and Bulgaria, and several European business 
representatives and policy experts express doubts about many American states’ courts 
adherence to international agreements and treatments of foreign investors (SIIA, 2014).
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Existing EU members also do not wish to give up their own intra-EU BITs with judicially weaker 
members (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria) without a replacement, as exemplified by Italy erecting six 
special investor courts after cancelling its intra-EU BITs in 2013, and five Member States 
 
 
(including Germany and Austria) proposing a ‘Super-ISDS’ to replace existing agreements 
(Council, 2016). 
 
Identifying the real problem as the partner rather than trade liberalization can also be inferred 
from the opponents’ fears regarding EU standards which anti-TTIP groups contend will either 
be lowered by having to adapt to American ones (by accepting American standards as 
equivalent, thus indirectly lowering European standards), or prevented from being 
strengthened because of ‘regulatory chill’ from the horizontal regulatory commitments 
through a regulatory cooperation body (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016). In other words, 
opponents doubt America’s level of consumer protection as well as the EU’s ability to stand up 
to US demands and to share ‘authority’ with the US (on asymmetric bargaining power, see 
Conceiçao-Heldt, 2014).  
 
CSOs’ prolific criticisms of American standards as ‘weak’ and ‘less safe’ have been effectively 
distributed through position papers, social media campaigns (90% of German social media 
posts on TTIP were negative, see Bauer, 2015; and twitter is dominated by anti-TTIP posts, see 
Ciofu and Stefanuta, 2016), protests, and public statements, often picked up by the 
mainstream media. Many opponents also point to leaked negotiating texts (proposals) they 
interpret as showing the Commission’s willingness to accommodate American demands on key 
issues (e.g. Greenpeace, 2016) – claims sternly rejected by the Commission.  
 
Yet, even if accepting that some US standards may be lower in certain areas, this should not, in 
reality, be a problem. The EU can refuse to accept certain US standards as equivalent to those 
in the EU, what Young (2015: 1241) calls the power of ‘exclusion’. Indeed, why would the EU 
offer a blank acceptance of US standards? Where is the precedent? The EU has already 
negotiated several comprehensive agreements with third countries with lower standards (at 
least in certain issues) without raising fears of a weakening of EU standards because nobody 
expects the automatic acceptance of those countries’ products. Even within the European 
Single Market mutual recognition does not always allow a product legally sold in one member 
to be sold in another; exceptions for health and safety ensure that some member states rules 
regarding a product or service are deemed non-equivalent by other Member States (European 
Commission, 2012:83, 2015d). To sustain their argument that TTIP will lower safety standards, 
opponents are thus assuming that the US will be able to impose its preferences even as this 
would entail the EU abandoning previous practices in trade negotiations and within its own 
single market.  
 
The problem is thus not the market system but rather the choice of partner; the US is 
presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to 
impose its preferences. Opponents are not demanding an increase of ‘authority’ over the 
‘market’. Rather, their preference is to preserve the status quo of fears that negotiations with 
 
 
the US will lead to EU member states losing control over domestic policies and EU standards. 
Public opposition to TTIP reflects such concerns with perceived threats to the European status 
quo, fueled by beliefs that the EU cannot stand up to American demands and that the US 
model is too liberal. In other words, opposition to TTIP is premised on a desire to preserve the 
EU’s internal equilibrium between free market forces and welfare economy (a sui-generis 
model of ’embedded liberalism’),
9
 rather than a desire to change it.  
 
4. Conclusion 
TTIP supporters’ focus on geopolitical gains, global standard and rule setting, as well as classic 
economic benefits of trade liberalization, reflect this agreement’s unprecedented nature from 
both an international and EU trade policy perspective. While other (past or present) bilateral 
agreements may also to varying degree stem from difficulties at multilateral negotiations, only 
TTIP qualifies on its own as a new means of setting global norms (a fact that may also help 
ensure its success as an ‘exit tactic’). Bièvre & Poletti’s assertion (this debate section) that TTIP 
is not (so) unique should therefore be qualified.    
 
Opponents focus on TTIP’s potential impact on public policy and safety standards, reflecting 
their concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the 
same. By deliberately choosing specific issues to evoke the greatest fears they have garnered 
unexpected and unprecedented public opposition to a trade agreement (Eliasson, 2016). Thus, 
rather than a larger debate on whether the market will become too liberalized (Polanyian 
moment) under modern trade agreements as De Ville & Siles-Brügge argue (this debate 
section), opponents’ evocation of fears, of ‘wild-west’ neo-liberalism and ‘lower standards’ 
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